I analyze the evolution of altruistic preferences in a population where individuals are matched pairwise to play a one-shot public goods game. I determine the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching. The stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity. In particular, if matching is completely random, spite is stable, and a positive degree of assortativity is necessary for pure sel…shness to be stable. Furthermore, the stable degree of altruism is increasing in the degree of assortativity, and it depends on the speci…cs of the public goods game.
Introduction
Life involves cooperation at most levels: animals hunt together, friends and family help each other, individuals work together to create and produce goods, countries sign trade agreements. Cooperation is ubiquitous, and it is next to impossible to imagine a world without it.
Not surprisingly, economists, biologists, political scientists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers alike are seeking to understand the forces that allow for cooperation to be sustained. This paper proposes some new theoretical results on the evolution of cooperation among humans.
Humans are peculiar beings, with extraordinary cognitive abilities, as well as an ability to remember the past and imagine the future. As such, they are ideal candidates for one of the leading theories of cooperation. According to this theory, cooperation may be sustained by way of reciprocity in repeated interactions between perfectly sel…sh individuals (Trivers, 1971 , Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981 , Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986 . Consistent with this theory are experimental …ndings that humans tend to punish those who fail to cooperate Gächter, 2000, Gächter and Herrmann, 2009) . However, there is also substantial evidence that a large fraction of individuals cooperate, against their own material interest, in one-shot interactions (Marwell and Ames, 1979 , Gächter et al., 2004 , Walker and Halloran, 2004 , Cubitt et al., 2008 , Gächter and Herrmann, 2009 . Such evidence suggests that humans may have a preference for cooperative over sel…sh behavior. Recent research in neuroscience provides support for this hypothesis (Rilling et al., 2002 , Moll et al., 2006 , Harbaugh et al., 2007 , Fehr and Camerer, 2007 .
These observations prompt several questions. First, if material welfare a¤ects individual success, can altruistic preferences survive? Second, can spite (negative altruism) also arise?
Third, can we predict the level of altruism based on some exogenously given speci…cs?
In this paper I provide a theory for the endogenous formation of altruistic preferences in a population where individuals are matched pairwise to play a public goods game.
1 This game captures key qualitative features of many common human interactions in the past, such as teamwork in food production, cooperative childrearing, and warfare: whereas the collective of individuals bene…ts from cooperation in these interactions, each individual would be materially better o¤ by free-riding on the others. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, equilibrium behavior and material payo¤s are determined for given altruistic preferences.
Second, assuming that an individual's material payo¤ a¤ects his or her reproductive success, I determine evolutionarily stable degrees of altruism.
In the baseline model, two individuals select contributions towards the production of a public good. 2 The individuals are altruistic, in the sense that they care about the other's material welfare. Altruism may be due to fraternal love, or, more generally, to ethics, e.g., in the case of teamwork in the workplace. I also allow for spite (negative altruism). Each individual knows the other's degree of altruism.
Altruism increases an individual's perceived bene…t from contributing, and hence, an individual's equilibrium contribution is increasing in his or her own altruism (empathy e¤ect of own altruism). By the same token, an individual's equilibrium contribution is decreasing in the other's altruism (free-rider e¤ect of the other's altruism): a higher contribution made by the other lowers an individual's marginal bene…t from contributing.
The evolutionary analysis closely follows the methodology developed by Alger and Weibull (2009) to determine evolutionarily stable degrees of altruism. This method is reminiscent of standard evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995) : it checks whether a population consisting of identical individuals (incumbents) would withstand the invasion by a small number of mutants. It deviates from standard evolutionary game theory, however, by endowing each individual with preferences rather than with a strategy. Hence, an individual chooses a strategy that maximizes his or her utility, given own and other's degree of altruism.
Players are matched pairwise to play the basic game introduced above. An incumbent degree of altruism is evolutionarily stable against a mutant degree of altruism 0 , if an individual with altruism gets a higher expected material payo¤ than an individual with altruism 0 .
Matching may be assortative: even though the number of mutants is small, the likelihood that a mutant is matched with another mutant may be signi…cant. An index of assortativity measures the probability with which a mutant is matched with another mutant.
It has long been known that assortative matching may be an important factor behind the evolution of altruistic behavior. In closely related work, Hamilton (1964a,b) and Bergstrom 2 A large part of the literature on the evolution of cooperation uses the prisoner's dilemma game, with two strategies. By contrast, I use a general public goods game with a continuous contribution variables. The public goods game may be viewed as a generalized version of the prisoner's dilemma game (Camerer and Fehr, 2004) . (1995) 3 analyze models where related individuals interact, so that the index of assortativity corresponds to Wright's coe¢ cient of relationship, r (Wright, 1922) , and where individuals are programmed to play a strategy. In such a setting, Hamilton's rule applies: an altruistic action will be taken if and only if rb > c, where c is the reduction of the actor's …tness, and b is the increase in the recipient's …tness. Hence, this rule predicts that individuals will behave as though they attached a weight of r to their sibling's material welfare.
By comparison, in the model at hand the stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the index of assortativity (except in the extreme case of perfect assortativity). In particular, if matching is random, spite is stable. This may seem counterintuitive, since a sel…sh individual behaves so as to maximize own material welfare. To see why sel…shness is not stable, think of a population with sel…sh incumbents and random matching. Then, a slightly spiteful mutant would almost certainly be matched with an incumbent, who would adjust his or her behavior to the mutant's lower degree of altruism by making a larger contribution than when playing against another incumbent. Hence, if matching is completely random, mutating towards a slightly negative degree of altruism involves a bene…t, but no cost.
By the same token, for sel…shness to be stable, there must be some cost involved in mutating towards a lower degree of altruism, which requires the mutant to meet another, relatively sel…sh, mutant with some positive probability. Furthermore, an increase in this probability means that a mutant becomes less likely to meet an incumbent: ceteris paribus, this implies that it becomes less bene…cial to mutate towards a lower degree of altruism.
Accordingly, the stable degree of altruism is strictly increasing in the degree of assortativity.
The model further predicts that, given a level of assortativity, the stable degree of altruism depends on the speci…cs of the basic game. This is because those speci…cs determine how strongly a mutant's opponent responds to the mutation at hand. The stronger this response is, the higher is the bene…t from mutating towards a lower degree of altruism, and the lower is the stable degree of altruism.
Qualitatively, the results in this paper con…rm those derived by Alger and Weibull (2009) , who …nd that the stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity, in a population where individuals are matched pairwise to play a game of risk sharing. By contrast, Bester and Güth (1998), Possajennikov (2000) , Bolle (2000) and Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2006) …nd that the stable degree of altruism is strictly positive, in a model 3 Other pieces on the importance of assortative matching include Haldane (1955) , Williams and Williams (1957) , Wilson (1977) , Robson (1990) , Grafen (2006) , and Nowak (2006 The remainder is organized as follows. In the next section the basic game between two altruistic individuals is analyzed. Section 3 is devoted to determining evolutionarily stable degrees of altruism. Section 4 studies how the evolutionarily stable degrees of altruism depend on the environment. Section 5 provides a discussion, and Section 6 concludes. All the mathematical proofs are in the appendix. If i contributes z i and j contributes z j , individual i obtains material welfare
A game between mutually altruistic individuals
and utility
where i 2 ( 1; L] is i's degree of altruism towards j, for some L 1. 5 Individuals observe each other's altruism level.
An altruistic individual may truly care about the welfare of the other individual, as would be the case if the game were played by relatives or friends. However, i may also measure the extent to which an individual internalizes the external e¤ects of his or her actions, e.g., on a business partner. As such it may re ‡ect a business ethic, which speci…es the "right thing to do,"and which does not require people to care about each other.
An individual's utility is also his or her payo¤ in the game. Assume that the players make their contributions simultaneously. Denote by the game thus de…ned.
Equilibrium contributions
Given a contribution z j , the necessary …rst-order condition for an interior best response z i 2 (0; z) for individual i is:
A Nash equilibrium (z A ;z B ) 2 (0; z) 2 must satisfy the following set of …rst-order conditions:
The next proposition establishes existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium.
5 I will generally refer to i as altruism although i < 0 indicates spite. Degrees of altruism i > 1 may exist, for instance in parents who are willing to sacri…ce their lives for the sake of their children. I rule out the uninteresting case where i 1 by assumption, since such high levels of spite would lead to the absence of contributions.
Proposition 1 For each (
An individual's degree of altruism determines his or her perceived bene…t from contributing. Since the individuals face the same cost, the most altruistic individual makes the largest contribution.
Letz : ( 1; L] 2 ! R be the function that describes the equilibrium contribution of an individual with altruism playing against an individual with altruism . This function is implicitly de…ned by:
Likewise, let V : ( 1; L] 2 ! R be the function that speci…es the equilibrium material utility of an individual with altruism playing against an individual with altruism :
Below, an index n = 1; 2 indicates a partial derivative with respect to the n-th argument for either of these functions.
Comparative statics
How would the equilibrium contributions described in Proposition 1 change if individuals became more altruistic?
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, an increase in an individual's degree of altruism raises the individual's equilibrium contribution,z 1 ( ; ) > 0, and lowers the other's equilibrium contribution,z 2 ( ; ) < 0. The sum of the contributions strictly increases:
An increase in an individual's own altruism increases his or her incentive to make a contribution for all levels of the other's contribution: there is an empathy e¤ect of own altruism. This in turn implies that the other's incentive to contribute declines: there is a free-rider e¤ect due to the other's altruism. I illustrate these e¤ects with a numerical example. Example 1 Suppose that F (Z) = Z for some 2 (0; 1), and that c (z) = 1 2 z 2 . Then individual i's best response to j's contribution z j , is de…ned by
and equilibrium contributions are de…ned bỹ 
Material welfare
The behavioral changes described in Proposition 2 a¤ects material welfare as follows.
Proposition 3 An individual always bene…ts materially from an increase in the other's altruism:
2 . An altruistic individual su¤ers materially from a further increase in own altruism: If, in a pair of individuals, the common degree of altruism changes, equilibrium material welfare changes: this may be interpreted as a between-pairs e¤ect of altruism on individual 6 In a model where two mutually altruistic individuals share risk, and choose risk-reducing e¤orts, Alger and Weibull (2009) …nd that an increase in the common level of altruism may cause equilibrium e¤ort to decline. Hwang and Bowles (2009) show that equilibrium contributions in a public goods game with repeated interactions may decline if pure altruism increases, as this reduces the incentive to punish stingy contributors. material welfare. This e¤ect is positive or negative, depending on whether or not the common degree of altruism is brought closer to = 1, the degree of altruism that maximizes equilibrium material welfare. Below it will be shown how the within-pairs and between-pairs e¤ects together a¤ect the evolution of altruism. 7
Expected material welfare
Assume now that the players are drawn from a large population, and are matched according to some rule. What is the expected material welfare of an individual with a certain degree of altruism? Here I describe the matching process that will be used in the evolutionary analysis.
Let there be only two degrees of altruism in the population, and 0 , and denote by x 2 [0; 1] the proportion of -altruists. Although random matching may sometimes be a reasonable assumption, assortative matching may happen naturally for many reasons. Let P ( j ) denote the conditional probability that an -individual is matched with another -individual. Then, the expected material payo¤ of an -altruist is
where V ( ; ), 2 f ; 0 g, is the material welfare of an individual with altruism playing against an individual with altruism (see (6)). Bergstrom (2003) shows that the conditional probability P ( j ) can be derived from the index of assortativity, which measures the di¤erence between the conditional probability that an -individual is matched with another -individual, and the conditional probability that an 0 -individual is matched with an -individual. Let (x) 2 [0; 1] denote this index. Then:
The two alternative ways to calculate the number of matches between -altruists and 0 -altruists leads to the following identity:
These two equations imply
and
Hence, an individual's expected material payo¤, as a function of his or her degree of altruism, the index of assortativity (x), and the population share x of -individuals, is
for an -individual, and
for an 0 -individual. These expressions are key in the evolutionary analysis below.
A special case arises when the index of assortativity does not depend on x. This case has been used in analyses by Wright (1921 ), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981 ), Bergstrom (2003 , and Alger and Weibull (2009) . One can interpret this case as follows: suppose there is a fraction 2 [0; 1] of individuals who are matched with an individual with the same degree of altruism, while the remaining fraction gets a random match. Then, for a randomly drawn -altruist,
This special case applies, in particular, to games played by relatives. In the following example, it is shown that, for siblings, = 1=2, independent of x. The second example illustrates another instance of assortative matching.
Example 2 Teamwork between relatives. Consider a society where grown-up siblings engage in teamwork. Assume that mating is random, and that each child inherits the mother's degree of altruism or that of the father with equal probability (inheritance may be due to education, imitation, or genetics). Suppose that a share x of the adult population carries degree of altruism 0 , while the remaining population share carries degree of altruism . A child who has altruism must have at least one parent with altruism . If the other parent also has altruism , which happens with probability 1 x, the child's sibling must also have altruism . If the other parent has altruism 0 , which happens with probability x, the child's sibling is an -altruist with probability 1=2, and an 0 -altruist with probability 1=2. Hence, the probability that an -altruist's sibling also is an -altruist is 1 x=2. Similarly, a child who is an 0 -altruist must have at least one parent with altruism an 0 . The probability that the other parent also has altruism an 0 is x. Hence, the probability that an 0 -altruist's sibling has altruism is (1=2) x=2. In this example, then, the index of assortativity is (x) = 1=2, the coe¢ cient of relationship between siblings (Wright, 1922) .
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Example 3 Teamwork in the workplace. In a workplace, may be interpreted as the extent to which an employee internalizes the external e¤ect of his behavior on another member of his or her team. A new batch of employees is hired each year. Every new employee is trained by one senior employee; suppose that each junior employee assimilates his or her mentor's attitude towards teamwork (the parameter in the model). Moreover, assume that, following training, in each group trained by one senior trainer, 80% of the junior employees are kept in that group, while the remaining 20% are randomly assigned to the other groups.
Then, in each group thus formed, junior employees are matched pairwise to work together on some task. If each group has n members, the index of assortativity is (x) = 0:8n 1 n 1 0:2n 1 n 1 (assuming that n > 5).
Evolutionarily stable altruism
Here I closely follow the methodology proposed by Alger and Weibull (2009) to determine evolutionarily stable degrees of altruism.
Consider a sequence of non-overlapping generations. In each generation, individuals are matched pairwise. Each matched pair plays game introduced above once, and each individual obtains the associated equilibrium expected material utility (see (6)). I assume that a higher expected material utility leads to a higher reproductive success, as measured by the expected number of o¤spring.
Initially the population consists entirely of individuals with some incumbent degree of altruism 2 ( 1; L]. In the next generation a mutant degree of altruism 0 6 = appears in a small share " > 0 of the population. 9 The incumbent degree of altruism is evolutionarily stable against degree of altruism 0 if an incumbent -individual gets a higher expected material payo¤ than a mutant 0 -individual, for all su¢ ciently small ". The incumbent degree of altruism is evolutionarily stable if this is true for every 0 6 = . As in standard evolutionary game theory, it is assumed that mutations are rare, in the sense that at most one mutant degree of altruism may occur in any given generation.
Focusing on situations with a constant index of assortativity , a su¢ cient condition for the incumbent altruism to be evolutionarily stable against 0 6 = is that
The left-hand side of this inequality is (approximately) the expected material payo¤ of an incumbent, while the right-hand side is the expected material payo¤ of a mutant, when the share of mutants is close to zero (let the proportion x of the incumbent altruism go to 1 in expressions (8) and (9)).
A degree of altruism 2 ( 1; L] is locally evolutionarily stable if inequality (10) holds for all 0 6 = near , and evolutionarily stable if it holds for all 0 6 = .
Determining stable degrees of altruism is facilitated by noting that, given the incumbent degree of altruism , the right-hand side of inequality (10) 
If the incumbent degree of altruism is , then D ( ) d is the e¤ect of a slight increase in a mutant's degree of altruism on the mutant's material payo¤. If D ( ) > 0, a mutant with 0 > gets a higher expected material payo¤ than an incumbent. Conversely, if D ( ) < 0, a mutant with 0 < outperforms the incumbents. Stability requires that there be no drift:
Proposition 5 (Alger and Weibull, 2009) A necessary condition for a degree of altruism 2 A to be locally evolutionarily stable is D ( ) = 0. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a degree of altruism 2 int (A) to be locally evolutionarily stable is (i)-(iii), where:
The …rst term in (11) shows how an individual's material utility would be a¤ected by a mutation in altruism, should the mutation be present in both players, an event that happens with probability . This between-pairs e¤ect of altruism favors drift towards higher degrees of altruism if < 1, and towards lower degrees of altruism if > 1 (see Proposition 4).
The second term shows how an individual's material utility would be a¤ected by a mutation in altruism, should the mutation not be present in the other player, an event that happens with probability 1 . This within-pairs e¤ect tends to favor drift towards lower degrees of altruism (see Proposition 3).
How do these e¤ects play out with the strategic interaction at hand? Straightforward calculations lead to the following expression for the drift function, when applied to game analyzed in the preceding section. 
The expression in (12) shows how the change in a mutant's material welfare depends on how the mutant (called M in the following discussion) as well as the mutant's opponent (called O in the following discussion) adjust their behaviors to the mutation. The terms with a factor represent M 's own adjustment. With certainty, M adapts to the change in own altruism (z 1 ( ; )); with probability , O is also a mutant, and M then adapts to the change in O's altruism (z 2 ( ; )). These adjustments are multiplied by , for whenever 6 = 0, the mutant's behavior diverges from material welfare maximization by a factor .
The other terms represent O's behavioral adjustments: whether O is a mutant or not, he or she adapts to M 's degree of altruism (z 2 ( ; )); with probability , O is a mutant, who then adapts to the change in his or her own altruism (z 1 ( ; )).
Hamilton's rule predicts that natural selection should lead to a degree of altruism equal to the index of assortativity . This rule does not apply here, since
for any < 1. More precisely:
Proposition 6 If = 1, then = 1 is the unique evolutionarily stable degree of altruism.
For any 2 [0; 1), any locally evolutionarily stable degree of altruism 2 A is such that < .
Equation (13) shows that divergence from Hamilton's rule arises because individuals adapt behavior to their opponent's degree of altruism. To see why Hamilton's rule would obtain absent this adjustment, setz 2 ( ; ) = 0 in (12): then, at the stable degree of altruism = , a mutant's cost of becoming slightly more altruistic (the term z 1 ( ; )) would be exactly o¤set by the bene…t of meeting another mutant (the term z 1 ( ; )).
Proposition 6 leads to two notable, and perhaps surprising, observations:
Corollary 2 If matching is random ( = 0), any stable degree of altruism is negative ( < 0). Furthermore, for purely self-regarding preferences to be evolutionarily stable ( = 0), there must be positive assortative matching ( > 0).
To see why this happens, consider a society with random matching, and suppose that initially individuals are sel…sh. Then:
In such a population a slightly spiteful mutant is almost certain to meet a purely sel…sh incumbent, who would adjust to the mutant's degree of altruism by making a higher e¤ort than against another incumbent. There is a bene…t and no cost involved in mutating towards a lower degree of altruism. By the same token, for sel…shness to be stable, there must be some cost involved in mutating towards a lower degree of altruism: this requires the between-pairs e¤ect to be at work, which happens only if there is some positive assortative matching.
Does the stable degree of altruism vary in some systematic way with the degree of assortativity? A higher means that the between-pairs e¤ect becomes more important relative to the within-pairs e¤ect (see (11)). Mutating towards more sel…shness becomes less bene…-cial, since the likelihood of being matched with another, relatively sel…sh, mutant increases.
Hence:
Proposition 7 Assume that for some index of assortativity < 1 there exists an evolutionarily stable degree of altruism < 1. An increase in would lead to an increase in the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism. To illustrate, in the parametric Example 1 the drift function is
The assumptions 2 (0; 1) and 2 [0; 1] imply that D is strictly decreasing in , and that it tends towards a strictly negative number as tends to . Figure 2 shows this function for ( ; ) = (0:5; 0:1). Where Hamilton's rule would predict that altruism be equal to one-half, here the unique stable degree of altruism is smaller than 0.25.
From (15), for any 2 (0; 1) and 2 [0; 1] the unique evolutionarily stable degree of altruism is given by: Figure 3 shows the stable degree of altruism as a function of the index of assortativity , for = 0:5. For su¢ ciently small the stable degree of altruism is negative.
Altruism and the speci…cs of the strategic interaction
The preceding analysis shows how the between-pairs and the within-pairs e¤ects of altruism on material welfare together determine the stable degree of altruism. These e¤ects are driven by modi…cations in equilibrium behavior following changes in altruism. Such modi…cations in turn depend on the speci…cs of the strategic interaction at hand.
Consider …rst Example 1, where the stable degree of altruism is given by (16). For a given degree of assortativity , the stable degree of altruism is increasing in the production function parameter . Figure 4 shows the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism as a function of and ; the leftmost curve is the set of values of ( ; ) for which = 0:3, while the rightmost curve is the set corresponding to = 0:9.
In this example the parameter measures how quickly the bene…ts to contributing diminish. It thus also measures the extent to which the marginal product of an individual is a¤ected by the other's contribution. A high value of means that the e¤ect is small: the marginal bene…t for an individual i of increasing input z i does almost not depend on the other's input. Hence, a¤ects the strength of the behavioral responses to changes in , and therefore also the stable degree of altruism.
As an illustration, assume that the incumbent degree of altruism is = 0:4, and that a mutant degree of altruism 0 = 0:5 appears. The reaction functions corresponding to the case = 0:9 are illustrated in Figure 5 . A pair of incumbents would make contributions at the intersection closest to the origin. Consider now a mutant; suppose it is individual A. If B is an incumbent, A su¤ers a material loss compared to incumbents: she then contributes more and her opponent contributes less than incumbents do. This is the within-pairs detrimental e¤ect of own altruism. By contrast, if B is also a mutant, they both contribute more than incumbents do, and they are better o¤ materially. This is the between-pairs bene…cial e¤ect of altruism.
In Figure 5 the reaction functions are very ‡at: whether playing against a mutant or an incumbent, an incumbent makes almost the same contribution. Compare this with Figure 1 , which shows the much steeper reaction functions associated with = 0:1. When = 0:1 an incumbent contributes much less when meeting a mutant, than when meeting an incumbent.
Hence, the within-pairs detrimental e¤ect of mutating towards a higher degree of altruism is stronger when = 0:1 than when = 0:9, and the stable degree of altruism is lower.
The example suggests that the stable degree of altruism depends on the speci…cs of the strategic interaction, because they a¤ect how strongly individuals respond to changes in one's own and in the other's altruism. The following proposition con…rms this, by showing how the evolutionary drift generally depends on the shapes of the production and cost functions.
Proposition 8 If individuals are matched pairwise to play game , according to the index of assortativity , the evolutionary drift may be written in terms of the production and the cost functions as follows:
Hence, D ( ) = 0 if and only if
(1 ) (1 + ) 2 F 00 (2z ( ; )) + ( ) c 00 (z ( ; )) = 0.
Proposition 8 shows that, together with the degree of assortativity , the second derivatives of the production and cost functions, F 00 and c 00 , are crucial in determining the stable degree of altruism. 10 This is because these derivatives a¤ect the strength of the individuals' behavioral responses to changes in one's own and the other's altruism.
Conclusion
This paper builds on Alger and Weibull (2009) to determine evolutionarily stable degrees of altruism in a population where individuals are matched pairwise to play a one-shot public 10 While the magnitude of the marginal product, F 0 (see (12)), a¤ects the steepness of the drift function, it is inconsequential for the sign of the drift.
goods game. More altruism means that individuals internalize the external e¤ects of their actions to a larger extent, and thus leads to more cooperation. While the evolutionary analysis con…rms existing theories about the positive impact of assortative matching on altruism, it also yields two qualitatively di¤erent predictions, which con…rm results derived in Alger and Weibull (2009) . First, the stable degree of altruism is lower than what is suggested by theories relying on selection of strategies rather than preferences (Hamilton, 1964 ,a,b, Bergstrom, 1995 . Second, the stable degree of altruism depends on the shapes of the bene…t and cost functions in the public goods game. The reason is that these functions determine an individual's incentive to free-ride on the other. If this incentive is large, then the within-pair e¤ect detrimental e¤ect of own altruism on material welfare is large, and the resulting stable degree of altruism is small.
A growing body of evidence shows signi…cant cross-cultural variability in altruistic behavior (Henrich et al., 2005, Gächter and Herrmann, 2009) . Besides the oft-cited multiple social equilibria (see, e.g., Henrich et al., 2005) , the results derived above suggest that such cross-cultural variability may stem from exogenously given di¤erences in the conditions in which groups evolved in the past, such as di¤erences in the degree of assortativity, or in the speci…cs of commonly played strategic interactions. Since cultural values and preferences tend to persist over time, 11 data about a people's ecological past may perhaps help us understand their current cultural values. 12 Because cultural values and preferences in turn a¤ect behavior, such research may ultimately provide a better understanding of economic development.
In the model at hand two individuals with pure altruism interact in a one-shot game. It would be desirable to extend the methodology developed in Alger and Weibull (2009) , and used in this paper, in a number of directions, e.g., to games with more than two individuals, to games with repeated interactions, to other classes of games, and to an index of assortativity that depends on the fraction of mutants. Some of these extensions are explored in Alger and Weibull (2010) . Furthermore, the method could be extended to study the formation of other preferences than pure altruism, such as reciprocal preferences (Levine, 1998 , Sethi and Somanathan, 2001 , Weibull, 2004 , Hwang and Bowles, 2009 , work ethic (Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006) , or a desire for social esteem (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008) . 
These arguments together imply that there exists a solution (z A ;z B ) to the system of equations (4). Since
If A = B the system of equations (4) 
, which, by strict convexity of c impliesz A =z B . Likewise, if i > j , i = A; B, i 6 = j, the system of equations (4) implies c 0 (z i ) > c 0 (z j ), which, by strict convexity of c impliesz i >z j .
Proposition 2
For any z j , equation (3) de…nes z i implicitly as a function of i . Applying the implicit function theorem:
2 ( 1; 0) (see the proof of Proposition 1),z 2 ( ; ) < 0, andz 1 ( ; ) +z 2 ( ; ) > 0.
Proposition 3
Since,
the partial derivatives V 1 and V 2 write
Using the …rst-order condition for an -altruist playing against a -altruist,
these expressions may be written
Recall thatz 1 ( ; ) > 0,z 2 ( ; ) < 0, and jz 1 ( ; )j > jz 2 ( ; )j, and F 0 > 0. Therefore, In game between an -altruist and a -altruist, the -altruist's equilibrium contribution satis…es (1 + ) F 0 (z ( ; ) +z ( ; )) = c 0 (z ( ; )) :
Clearly, for any > 1,z ( ; ) > z m (z ( ; )), and @Y (z;v) @z jz=z( ; ) < 0. Finally, note that Y is increasing in v. Sincez 1 ( ; ) > 0 andz 2 ( ; ) < 0, the equilibrium material utility of the -altruist increases as a result of an increase in (V 2 ( ; ) > 0).
Proposition 4
If A = B = , the unique symmetric Nash equilibriumz ( ; ) satis…es
(1 + ) F 0 (2z ( ; )) = c 0 (z ( ; )) :
Comparison with the equation de…ning the contribution that maximizes the sum of the material utilities,
yields:z ( ; ) = z , A = B = 1, < 1 )z ( ; ) < z , and > 1 )z ( ; ) > z .
Let W (z) denote individual material utility if both contribute the same amount z:
By the assumptions on F and c, W is strictly concave in z. Since W is maximized for z = z , W 0 (z) > 0 for all z < z , and W 0 (z) < 0 for all z > z . Sincez ( ; ) is strictly increasing in , the result in the proposition obtains.
Lemma 1
Since
equations (20) and (21) may be used to write
6.6 Proposition 6
I …rst show that a stable degree of altruism cannot exceed 1. Since
Propositions 3 and 4 imply D ( ) < 0 for all 2 (1; L].
Second, suppose that = 1. Then,
Since F 0 > 0 and sincez 1 ( ; ) +z 2 ( ; ) > 0 (see Proposition 2), this is strictly positive for all < 1, and equal to 0 if = 1.
Finally, suppose that 2 [0; 1). Then,
is strictly negative for any 2 [ ; 1], since ( )z 1 ( ; ) 0 and (1 )z 2 ( ; ) < 0.
Proposition 7
Assume that for some functions F , and c, and some < 1, there exists a unique evolutionarily stable degree of altruism; let^ denote this stable degree of altruism. From Proposition 5, D ( ) > 0 for all nearby <^ , and D ( ) < 0 for all nearby >^ .
Since D ( ) = V 1 ( ; ) + V 2 ( ; ), and V 2 ( ; ) > 0, an increase in leads to an increase in D ( ), for every . Hence, if D is continuous, there exists " > 0 such that D (^ + ") = 0, D ( ) > 0 for <^ + ", and D ( ) < 0 for >^ + ".
Proposition 8
Using the system of equations in (5),and applying the implicit function theorem: [c 00 (z ( ; ))] 2 2 (1 + ) F 00 (z ( ; ) +z ( ; )) c 00 (z ( ; )) :
Since F 0 > 0, F 00 < 0, and c 00 > 0, the sign of D ( ) is determined by the sign of
(1 ) (1 + ) 2 F 00 (2z ( ; )) + ( ) c 00 (z ( ; )) :
